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A LESSON IN INCAUTION, OVERWORK, AND FATIGUE:




Judicial opinions deserve to be taken seriously. Only when we
do take them seriously, when the profession insists that their
authors hold themselves to standards as high as those by which
the great composers, writers, and painters [are judged] will it be
possible ... to consider judicial opinions as one of the fine arts
without running the risk of being thought facetious.1
The primary adjudicative responsibility of the United States Su-
preme Court is not to the immediate parties that appear before it,
but to a larger audience-society generally, lawyers and courts
more specifically.2 The Court is the interpreter and practical en-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1973, University
of California at Los Angeles. Professor Joe Grano was very generous with his time, listening
to the author's meanderings as well as reading and providing useful criticisms of an earlier
draft of this article. I thank him. I dedicate this article to my former Criminal Law students,
Class of 1986, at U.C.L.A. School of Law, who in a time of supposed student apathy and all-
consuming concern about careers, expressed deep feelings about the trends in constitutional
criminal law and about proper judicial craftsmanship. They made it fun to be a teacher.
1. Younger, On Judicial Opinions Considered as One of the Fine Arts: The Coen Lec-
ture, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 352-53 (1980).
2. Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DuKE L.J. 59, 62; Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARv. L. REv.
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forcer of our constitutional rights. It uses its decision-making au-
thority to establish and defend legal principles of broad, rather
than sectarian, value. To be effective, the Court must write opin-
ions which are clear in their reasoning and straightforward in their
handling of precedent.3 If we do not always like the principles
enunciated or the results reached by the high court, we are at least
entitled to understand what those principles are, and to know how
they were reached.
No court can fulfill its institutional responsibility, however, if it
is overworked. An overworked court is one unlikely to have the
time, or its justices to have the energy, to fully research the law,
and then to properly consider that law. The product of such imper-
fect deliberations-the published opinion-is more likely to be the
victim of haste and fatigue than it is to be the beneficiary of calm,
collegial input. The opinion probably will resemble graffiti more
than it will resemble a work of fine art.4 Too often, the message of
the opinion of an overworked court is obscured by imperfect organ-
ization, weighty verbiage, and the presence of separate opinions,
containing language divisive in content and temperamental in
tone.5
To properly fulfill its role as arbiter of constitutional rights and
to avoid the damage that results from an overloaded docket, Su-
preme Court justices must choose carefully the vehicles through
which they invoke broad and fundamental principles. They must
choose neither too few nor too many cases; and the cases they do
choose should be peculiarly suited, procedurally and substantively,
both for adjudication and, ultimately, for the enunciation of the
constitutional principles.
Unfortunately, the current Court largely is failing in its adjudi-
cative responsibilities. Heavily worked,6 the Court is straining its
1127, 1128 (1981).
3. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1979).
4. See generally Younger, supra note 1.
5. See generally Davis & Reynolds, supra note 2, at 77; Gewin, Opinions-Dissents, Spe-
cial Concurrences, Policy, Techniques, 63 F.R.D. 594 (1974); Note, Of High Designs: A
Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARv. L. REV.
307 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, High Designs]. But see Note, The Precedential Value
of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 760 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Precedential Value].
6. See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
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institutional and personal resources. As a result of an apparent
mission to limit the scope of constitutional rights as defined by the
Warren Court, the Burger Court has adopted an activist approach
to adjudication, diving headlong rather than wading into the sea of
constitutional controversies. It agrees to hear too many cases, and
frequently the cases that it does hear are the wrong ones. The re-
sults are uneven: at times the Court has succeeded in narrowing
the scope of the law; at times, however, it has had to back down
and wait for a more propitious vehicle.7 Worst of all, justices fre-
quently write opinions so unsatisfactory that even ideological com-
rades are disappointed. Its opinions often lack the clarity or co-
gency that we expect from our highest court.
This Article is the tale of Segura v. United States,8 a Supreme
Court opinion that should not have been, a disaster in judicial
decisionmaking, and the probable victim of the fatigue that comes
from overwork.' The tale has a moral-the Court, rather than con-
centrating on changing the direction of constitutional law, should
focus its energy on the cautious selection of cases and the prepara-
tion of well-crafted opinions. Ultimately, Segura may tell us more
about the need for such caution and care by the Court than it tells
about correct application of fourth amendment jurisprudence.
II. THE COURT'S WORKLOAD
A. The Extent of the Workload
To put Segura in context, one first must focus on the extent of
the Court's workloadt If not overworked, the Supreme Court is, at
least, heavily worked.
In its first fourteen years, the Burger Court 0 docketed an aver-
age of 4752 cases per term, of which it disposed of an average of
3867 cases." This workload has increased, not decreased. In the
7. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
8. 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984).
9. See generally infra text accompanying notes 76-127 & 175-239.
10. For purposes of clarity, I use the term "Burger Court" to identify the Supreme Court,
beginning with the 1969 term, when Mr. Chief Justice Warren Burger began serving as the
Court's leader. I use the term "Warren Court" to identify the prior Supreme Court, for
which Earl Warren served as Chief Justice.
11. All statistics regarding the number of cases docketed during the 1969 through 1982
(but not the 1983) terms, the number of written opinions of the Court, as well as their
19851
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past three years, 15,534 cases reached the Court, an average of
5178 per term, eleven percent higher than the norm for the preced-
ing eleven years.
Most cases did not require full review. Nonetheless, the Court
has published an average of 144 majority opinions or an average
total of 348 opinions including concurrences and dissents, each
year. These figures disguise particularly substantial increases in
the number of opinions over the most recent court terms.12
Whatever the cause, the recent increase in Court opin-
ions'13-majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting-has re-
sulted in a remarkable number of published words.' 4 Through the
first fourteen years of the Burger Court, for example, West Pub-
lishing Company15 published 42,225 pages, or 3016 pages per year,
of Court opinions, orders, and in-chamber opinions. As with the
docket, verbiage has recently risen dramatically. The 1980 through
1982 terms saw the publication of 10,259 pages (or nearly twenty-
five percent of the number amassed in the past fourteen years) at
an average of 3419 pages per year, thirteen percent higher than in
the earlier Burger years.' 6 Dividing the fourteen years into two
identification as "criminal" cases, are based on the figures provided by the Harvard Law
Review in their annual reviews of the Supreme Court terms. The Review also provides five-
year tables of the Court terms; these tables may be found at 87 HARv. L. REV. 310-14 (1973)
(1968-1972 period); 92 HARv. L. REV. 336-39 (1978) (1973-1977 period); and 97 HARv. L. REV.
303-06 (1983) (1978-1982 period). For an excellent analysis of the Court's workload, see G.
CAsPER & R POSNER. THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1976).
12. During the 1979 through 1982 Court terms, the Court averaged 375 opinions, a figure
eight percent higher than the average during the entire fourteen-year period.
13. Of particular interest is the recent Court penchant for concurring opinions, which has
resulted in the Court's frequent inability to muster majority rationales for its judgments.
Until 1956, there were only 35 cases with no clear-cut majority. Comment, Supreme Court
No-Clear-Majority Decision: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 99 (1956). Since
then, the plethora of separate opinions that frequently have resulted in plurality opinions,
has caused many commentators to discuss the danger of such opinions. Davis & Reynolds,
supra note 2, at 63-75.
14. Many of those words are strident. For a discussion of vituperation expressed in
Segura, see infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
15. Because of the delay in publication of the official advance sheets of the United States
Reports, I have instead compiled figures using the published pages of the Supreme Court
Reporter.
16. The actual increase in published pages is partially obscured by the fact that West
apparently published only four "memorandum decisions" per page, regardless of available
space, until 1974 when it seems to have generally begun to place up to six such decisions on
each page.
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seven-year periods, the work of the Court in the earlier period re-
quired an average of 2810 pages; the more recent period resulted in
3222 pages per term.17
A large share of the Court's work involves issues largely "crimi-
nal" in nature.1 8 In its first fourteen years, the Burger Court wrote
530 full 'opinions, or 38 opinions per term, in this field.19 Assuming
that all opinions generally take the same time to produce, 0 ap-
proximately one-quarter of the Court's time for deliberation and
opinion writing has gone to cases involving criminal law or
procedure.
B. "Workload" as "Overload"
By any numerical standard,2 ' the Burger Court must, and does,
work very hard. Numbers cannot tell everything, however. They
cannot prove that the Court works too hard. Ultimately, that judg-
17. The number of cases docketed, the number of court opinions, and the number of pub-
lished pages in those opinions represent only three, relatively objective, ways to measure the
workload of a court. Some cases by their nature are more difficult to decide and more physi-
cally draining than others.
One probably can assume that cases raising constitutional, rather than statutory, issues
are more difficult to decide. These cases frequently raise a myriad of subissues, and are
more apt to implicate broad, controversial issues of policy and moral principle. See Note,
supra note 2, at 1138. Justices are less likely, as a result, to sign opinions that conflict with
their deeply held views. Compromise is less likely; more opinions and more energy will be
required. See infra note 28. One also can assume that the deliberative process-and the
ultimate opinions-will be more highly charged. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHix 410-30
(1983) (discussion of strident deliberative process in the reapportionment case, Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARs, 1939-1975, at 39 (1980) (describ-
ing the "Japanese internment" case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), as the
product of fear; and the case of Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953), as the
product of the cold war possessing a "highly explosive atmosphere," to which he apparently
believes the justices fell victim). Because most of the Court's work involves constitutional
issues, many of which are highly emotive, the Court's workload probably is greater than the
statistics themselves might imply.
18. See supra note 11.
19. During the 1980 through 1982 terms, however, the number of criminal cases de-
creased. The court wrote 27, 30, and 33 full opinions in those years, respectively. This recent
trend has ended, however. For the figures during the 1983 term, see infra notes 30-38 and
accompanying text.
20. All constitutional cases are difficult. See supra note 17. Cases pertaining to criminal
justice, however, are apt to be among the most value-laden and divisive. After all, human
lives and liberty are at stake, as is the right of citizens to be reasonably free from crime.
Criminal cases are likely to generate great tension among the justices.
21. For subjective evidence of the Court's heavy workload, see supra note 17.
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ment is subjective. Those of us with a "mission" are tempted to
characterize a sympathetic court as one that is functioning well,
and one at odds with our "mission" as too involved.
More than 3000 pages of court opinions per term are a lot of
pages,22 but are they too many? Observers of the Court,23 including
many of the justices themselves,24 think so. They maintain that the
Court is impaired by the justices' substantial responsibilities. Calls
for structural and procedural reforms, therefore, increasingly are in
vogue.2 5
Certainly many cases must be heard; and the number of days in
the court term, as well as the energy level of the justices them-
selves, are limited. The Court's increasing workload, therefore,
only increases the likelihood that time and energy will run out, and
that poor decisionmaking will result.
Even if the characterization "poor decisionmaking" is largely a
subjective one, one can nonetheless agree with Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's conclusion that the judicial process is at its best when
opinions flow from comprehensive briefing, powerful argumenta-
tion by both sides, and lengthy deliberations.2" Justice Frankfurter
also would, no doubt, caution a Court to be exceedingly careful
when exercising its discretion to hear cases. It must do so for two
reasons. First, only if it is slow to grant hearings will the Court's
22. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
23. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 2, at 77; Note, Precedential Value, supra note 5, at
759; Note, High Designs, supra note 5, at 307.
24. Eight justices have called for reexmination of the Court's workload and procedures.
Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230 (1982);
Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.BA. J. 442 (1983); Marshall,
Remarks at the Second Circuit Judiciary Conference (Sept. 9, 1982) (available on request
from the Public Information Office of the United States Supreme Court); O'Connor, Com-
ments on the Supreme Court's Caseload (delivered in New Orleans, La., on February 6,
1983) (available from the Public Information Office); Powell, Are the Federal Courts Be-
coming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B. J. 1370 (1982); Rehnquist, Are the True Old Times
Dead?, MacSwinford Lecture at the University of Kentucky (September 23, 1982) (available
from the Public Information Office); Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Ju-
DICATURE 177 (1982); White, Challenges for the Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary
Reflection, 51 ANTITRUST L. J. 275 (1980).
25. See Note, High Designs, supra note 5 (containing a summary of such proposals).
26. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also
Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 1301, 1301 (1974) (calling for opin-
ions "as invulnerable and persuasive as they can be made by research, reflection, collabora-
tion, mutual criticism, and accommodation").
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workload remain manageable. Only then can it afford the time for
long deliberations and for the drafting and redrafting of proposed
opinions. Second, only if the Court chooses cases with great care
will it reasonably ensure that the cases it does hear reach it in a
fashion conducive to the comprehensive briefing and full argumen-
tation so important to the adversary process.
The judicial process also requires good opinion writing. The
Court must develop its thesis in a manner both coherent and per-
suasive. Good opinions result in part from good briefing, argumen-
tation, and deliberation. But the success of the process is primarily
a function of serious concern for the importance of the written
word,27 and for the proper organization of one's arguments. Both
take time and patience. Neither can exist unless the justices limit
their decision-making role.
The best evidence of the Court's overload, then, if it exists, is its
own opinions. They represent the tangible results of the Court's
decision to grant certiorari, of the parties' briefing and argumenta-
tion, and of the Court's deliberative process.
The numbers suggest a heavy workload; the commentators' fear
is that the load is too great. If it is, opinions generated in the most
recent term should reflect that overload. Indeed, the 1983 term
pressed the Court beyond reasonable limits. 28 For better or for
worse, the justices granted hearing and rendered decisions in some
of the most important and value-laden areas of constitutional and
statutory law.2 9 Specifically, in reversing the recent trend away
27. See generally Younger, supra note 1.
28. Justice Blackmun has been quoted as having described the 1983 value-laden term as
"exciting, but not very enjoyable," and that he was "never so tired" as he was at the end of
it. Barbash & Kamen, Supreme Court: 'A Rotten Way to Earn a Living,' Wash. Post Nat'l
Weekly Ed., Oct. 1, 1984, at 33, col. 1.
29. Besides the criminal cases, see infra note 31 and accompanying text, the Court con-
sidered cases pertaining to discrimination against women, see Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984); racial
discrimination, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984); affirmative action, see
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); freedom of speech, see
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct.
2118 (1984); freedom of press, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); free-
dom of religion, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984); and draft registration, see
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984).
The value-laden issues can make adjudication difficult. See supra note 17.
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from deciding "criminal" cases," the Court wrote opinions in ap-proximately 1 forty-nine cases with criminal law overtones. Most of
30. See supra note 19.
31. This figure is based on my own compilation of cases that primarily raise issues of
criminal law or procedure in the following areas (which are, of course, applicable to the cases
that began in state court through the fourteenth amendment due process clause):
FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES: Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Men-
doza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings); Segura v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984) (dissipation of taint); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct.
3424 (1984) ("good faith" exception to exclusionary rule); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984) (same); United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (electronic beeper case);
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (prison cell search); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct.
2091 (1984) (house arrest); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758
(1984) (factory immigration surveys); Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (open
fields); United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984) (meaning of "search" and
"seizure"); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 769 (1983) (interpretation of Fair Labor
Standards Act); Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984) (fire investigation).
FIFTH AMENDMENT CASES: Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984) (due process,
contact visitation for pretrial detainees); Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984) (Mi-
randa "custody" during traffic stops); Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984) (grand
juries, discrimination in selection of foreman); Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217
(1984) (due process, judicial vindictiveness); Richardson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3081
(1984) (double jeopardy); Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. 2916 (1984) (due process,
prosecutorial vindictiveness); New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (Miranda public
safety exception); Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536 (1984) (double jeopardy, guilty plea);
Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (due process [Fourteenth Amendment] juvenile
preventive detention); Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984) (due process, guilty plea
bargain broken); California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984) (due process, discovery of
results of breath analysis test); Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984) (double jeopardy,
capital sentencing); James v. Kentucky, 104 S. Ct. 1830 (1984) (jury instruction on defen-
dant's silence); Justices of Boston Municipal Ct. v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984) (double
jeopardy, two-tiered trial system); United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984) (privilege
against self-incrimination generally); Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984) (privilege
against self-incrimination and Miranda); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984) (double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and civil proceedings).
SIXTH AMENDMENT CASES: Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984) (right to impar-
tial jury); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (inevitable discovery); United States v.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984) (right to counsel in solitary confinement); Waller v. Georgia,
104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984) (defendant's right to exclude public from pretrial suppression hear-
ing); United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984) (adequacy of counsel); Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (same); Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984) (right to
counsel, retroactivity of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)); Flanagan v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984) (right to counsel, conflict of interest); McKaskle v. Wiggins,
104 S. Ct. 944 (1984) (right to counsel, self-representation); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984) (juries, exclusion of public); Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453
(1983) (juries, judicial ex parte communication with juror).
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES: Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (capital
sentencing, judicial overriding of jury); Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984) (capital sen-
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these involved major, controversial issues. During the term, the
Court substantially curtailed substantive protections of the fourth
amendment, 2 narrowed the amendment's exclusionary rule, 3
carved out the most significant exception to its Miranda rule,34
permitted some forms of preventive detention,35 provided the
greatest guidance to date regarding the nature of the right to coun-
sel at trial,36 and further clarified the complicated law regarding
capital punishment. 7 The published opinions of the 1983 term re-
quired 3593 printed pages in the Supreme Court Reporter, the
most ever.38
If jurisprudence as enunciated in the opinions of the Court suf-
fers as a result of overwork, it should follow that the problem
would be exacerbated at the end of the court term. Cases argued
and deliberated and opinions written during the last few months of
the term should suffer more than the rest, as time for debate and
tencing, proportionality review).
MISCELLANEOUS CASES: Reed v. Ross, 104 S.. Ct. 2901 (1984) (habeas, meaning of
"cause"); United States v. Yermian, 104 S. Ct. 2936 (1984) (statutory construction, making
false statements); Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984) (Civil Rights Act, immunity of
public defender); Dixson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1172 (1984) (statutory construction of
bribery statute); Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984) (statutory construction of
appealability statute); Wainwright v. Goode, 104 S. Ct. 378 (1983) (habeas, capital sentenc-
ing); Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983) (statutory construction, RICO statute).
32. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (prisoners have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a cell search); Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (open
fields not protected by fourth amendment); United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652
(1984) (reopening damaged package not "search"); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984) ("factory survey" not a "seizure"). But see Welsh v. Wiscon-
sin, 104 S. Ct. 2091 (1984) (warrant required to arrest individual in home for violation of a
noncriminal traffic offense).
33. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984) (valid independent search
warrant renders search untainted despite illegal entry); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984) ("good faith" exception to exclusionary rule added); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984) (same); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S.
Ct. 3479 (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in deportation proceedings); Nix v. Williams,
104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) ("inevitable discovery" exception to fourth amendment and sixth
amendment exclusionary rule is permitted).
34. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) ("public safey" exception).
35. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
36. United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984).
37. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (judicial overriding of jury recommenda-
tion of life imprisonment); Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984) (proportionality review).
38. The previous high was in the 1982 term, in which 3574 pages were required.
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conciliation runs out, as energy reaches its lowest ebb, as the feel-
ings of justices are most tender, and as the chasms between them
are the greatest.
Ultimately, the subjectivity of the question and the comparative
"Iron Curtain" around the deliberative processes of the Court 9 re-
quire that the claim of poor decisionmaking be framed cautiously
as one of opinion, not of fact, and that the thesis that such deci-
sionmaking is the result of overload be considered speculative.
Nonetheless, within these confines, I make such a claim.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to canvass all opinions in
this or any recent year. Even an analysis of all the opinions de-
cided at the conclusion of the 1983 Court year is impractical.40 In-
39. Some authors have pierced the curtain. See, e.g., R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN (1979); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17.
40. Such a canvass would be worthwhile. Even a quick glance at the concluding cases of
the 1983 term boggles the mind. In ways perhaps unprecedented, the justices wrote opinions
near the end of the term that make counting justices' votes in the opinions seem nearly
impossible withoUt a computer. For some particularly divided opinions, see Tower v. Glover,
104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984) (O'Connor, J. delivered the opinion of the Court in which Burger, C.
J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in all but the first paragraph of Part
IV of which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, JJ., joined); Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (Blackmun, J., deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C.J., and Powell and O'Connor, JJ., joined;
in all but a portion of page 8 in Part II of White and Rehnquist, JJ., joined; and in Part II
of which Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Rehnquist, J. joined. Stevens, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
joined); Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217 (1984) (Burger, C.J., announced the judg-
ment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, III-A,
Ill-C, and IV, in which White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., joined, and
an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and III-B, in which White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor,
JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which Blackmun, J., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
which Marshall, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment); United
States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Powell, JJ., joined, in Parts I, II, and IV of which
Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., joined, and in Part III of which Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in which Rehnquist, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined); Regan v. Time, Inc., 104 S.
Ct. 3262 (1984) (White, J., announced the judgment of the court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Part II-A, in which Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B, II-C, and II-D in
which Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion
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stead, this Article focuses on one of the cases decided in the diffi-
cult 1983 term, a case announced on the last day of that term.
That case is Segura v. United States.41 That case illustrates, as
well as any case can, a Court too incautious in its work, and a
Court working beyond its peak, or even moderate, level of
efficiency.
III. THE FACTS OF Segura
On February 12, 1981, United States Drug Enforcement Agency
officials apparently violated the constitutional rights of Luz Co-
lon42 and three others43 when the government agents entered Co-
lon's and Andres Segura's third-floor apartment at 11:15 p.m. with-
out a necessary 44 search warrant, and arrested the four occupants
without arrest warrants.45 The officers entered after they arrested
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined. Powell, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Blackmun, J., joined. Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The problems of haste at the end of the Court term may explain, too, why Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), decided on July 1, 1981, was overruled eleven months later
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Justice Powell had concurred in the judgment
of Robbins, despite reservations, noting that a crucial issue was not pressed by the parties,
"and it is late in the term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doc-
trines." 453 U.S. at 435.
41. 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984).
42. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York found no exi-
gency to enter the premises. See Segura v. United States, No. 81-CR-80(5), memorandum of
decision and order at 11-12 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 1981) (available in Joint Appendix to the
Petition on Writ of Certiorari at 11, United States v. Segura, Nos. 82-1062, 82-1064 (2d Cir.
June 29, 1982)) [hereinafter cited as Segura, District Court Memorandum]. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. See United States v. Segura, 663
F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1981). Consequently, absent any exception to the warrant require-
ment, the police needed a warrant to enter. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973). Although the police did have probable cause to arrest Colon, they did not know
Colon when they saw her. Joint Appendix on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 82-5298 at 11 [hereinafter cited as Joint App.]. In any
case, they needed an arrest warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S 573 (1980) (the
fourth amendment prohibits warrantless entries absent exigent circumstances).
43. Even assuming the police had probable cause to arrest the three persons caught up in
the sweep, arrest warrants would have been required. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S 573
(1980). To further protect Colon's interest, the police would also have needed a search war-
rant. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (absent exigent circumstances or
consent, police may not search a home without a warrant).
44. See Segura, District Court Memorandum, supra note 42, at 11.
45. Id.
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Segura in the first-floor apartment lobby.46 Although the officers
had no reason to believe anyone was in the apartment," they forci-
bly took a handcuffed and resistant Segura to the apartment,
knocked on the door, and then forcibly entered after a surprised
Colon opened the door.48
The agents had probable cause to search the apartment. In fact,
five hours earlier they had notified the United States Attorney of
their evidence for such a search. He dissuaded them from immedi-
ately seeking a search warrant, informing them that the "lateness
of the hour"-6:30 p.m.-made issuance of a warrant unlikely until
the next morning.4 Instead, he advised them to go to the apart-
ment, arrest Segura and Colon, for whom they had probable cause,
and then "secure the premises" awaiting issuance of the search
warrant.50 With that advice, the police entered the Segura-Colon
apartment.5 1 After arresting the four persons they found immedi-
ately, the police searched for any additional persons. During that
process, the agents observed, but did not confiscate, drug para-
phernalia on a bathroom table and in a bedroom closet.2 They
found no one else. While some agents took the arrested parties to
DEA offices, two agents remained in the unoccupied apartment,
awaiting issuance of the search warrant.
5 3
In what was described by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit as "administrative delays, ' 54 but which the dis-
trict court had not so characterized, 55 no warrant was issued until
6:00 p.m. the following day. Apparently the delay resulted from the
failure of the United States Attorney to apply in timely fashion for
46. United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1981).
47. Id.
48. Segura, District Court Memorandum, supra note 42, at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Petitioners claim the United States Attorney instructed the officers to secure the
premises from outside. Joint Petition on Writ of Certiorari at 4, United States v. Segura,
Nos. 82-1062, 82-1064 (2d Cir. June 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Joint Petition]. None of
the courts, however, make note of any such specificity in their orders.
52. United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1981).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The district court provided no explanation for the "lapse" of time. Segura, District
Court Memorandum, supra note 42, at 11.
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the warrant.56 The agents remained in the apartment for about
nineteen hours before the warranted search occurred. The applica-
tion for the warrant was based solely on information obtained by
the police prior to the entry in the apartment. Indeed, apparently
no one informed the magistrate of the officers' entry into the living
quarters of Colon and Segura, nor of their ongoing day-long occu-
pation therein.57 The agents did not seize the contraband and
fruits and instrumentalities of crime until the evening following
the unlawful entry into and occupation of the apartment.
Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(3), 5 s Segura and Colon made a
pretrial motion to suppress all of the items seized in the apart-
ment. The government opposed the motion, arguing that the
agents' initial entry into, and subsequent occupation of, the apart-
ment were constitutional.59 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York disagreed. The officers had had
no reason to believe the house was occupied, nor did they have any
basis to believe that, if anyone was present, such persons would
have been aware of Segura's arrest, which occurred three floors be-
low.6 0 In short, no evidence existed supporting the agents' appar-
ent belief that destruction of the evidence in the apartment was
56. The government later conceded that "[iut is not clear why a greater effort was not
made to obtain a search warrant when the officers first sought one ..... Respondent's Brief
on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 40 n.23, United States v. Segura, Nos. 82-1062, 82-
1064 (2d Cir. June 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Respondents Brief]. It assured the Su-
preme Court that the "failure" would not be repeated in future cases, and that the United
States Attorney, subsequent to the present failure, circulated an internal memorandum
"reemphasizing" the importance of seeking warrants when possible. Id. The warrant appli-
cation was not presented to a magistrate until 5:00 p.m. on February 13, nearly 23 hours
after the initial contact with the United States Attorney. Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct.
3380, 3397 n.17 (1984) (citing testimony at the suppression hearing in the district court at
Tr. 162-63). The agents claimed "it's very hard to get secretarial services today." 104 S. Ct.
at 3397.
57. Joint Petition, supra note 51, at 17.
58. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) reads in pertinent part:
Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without
the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion .... The
following must be raised prior to trial:
(3) Motions to suppress evidence ....
F. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
59. Segura, District Court Memorandum, supra note 42, at 11.
60. Id. at 12.
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imminent. The court also found unreasonable the nearly twenty-
hour delay in obtaining the search warrant. The delay "deprived
the lawful occupant of the apartment, Luz Colon, of her right
freely to occupy and control the same."'" That the officers eventu-
ally acquired a valid search warrant did not matter. But for the
unlawful government conduct, the evidence would not inevitably
have been discovered because "Colon might well have destroyed
the evidence had she not been illegally excluded. ' 62 The district
court, therefore, excluded all of the items seized pursuant to the
warrant.
The Second Circuit affirmed in part the district court's judg-
ment, but reversed significant portions of it."3 It agreed with the
district court, and rejected the government's continued claim to
the contrary, that the warrantless entry was unconstitutional.6 4 It
affirmed the suppression of the paraphernalia discovered in the in-
itial entry. 5 It rejected perfunctorily"" the government's argument
that the items were not "seized" until after the search warrant was
obtained. Given the "potential for abuse" 6 7-that officers would
create their own emergency circumstances to justify the initial en-
try-the court concluded that suppression was appropriate.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, how-
ever, regarding the exclusion of the remainder of the evidence.68
Despite the illegal entry, it rejected as speculative the district
court's argument that the evidence might have been destroyed had
the unlawful entry not occurred. 9 It also described such analysis
as "prudentially unsound" 70 since it would result in penalizing of-
ficers for what the court, perhaps inaccurately,71 described as
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 414-15.
65. Id. at 417.
66. "Finally we reject the government's argument that the evidence ... should not be
suppressed because it was not actually 'seized' until after the search warrant was obtained."
Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 416-17.
69. Id. at 416.
70. Id. at 417.
71. The apartment had been under direct surveillance for three hours. The agents heard
nothing when one officer pressed his ear to the apartment door, no lights were visible, and
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"their happenstance accuracy" 72 in believing that someone on the
premises wished to destroy the criminal evidence. It would be an
"ironic twist,"73 the court intoned, if the fourth amendment re-
quired exclusion of evidence when criminals are on the scene, but
permitted admission when they are not.74 Although it did not use
such terms, the Second Circuit apparently was unwilling to con-
sider the items first discovered during the warranted search as
tainted by the initial illegality.
With most of the incriminating evidence rendered admissible,
Segura and Colon were convicted. Both defendants appealed their
convictions.75 From the affirmance of their convictions, Segura and
Colon jointly petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari.
IV. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
A. Segura as an Impropitious Court Vehicle
The Supreme Court can most effectively develop its constitu-
tional jurisprudence when it is exceedingly cautious in using its
discretion to grant petitions for writs of certiorari. The high court
no car known to belong to Segura or Colon was in the vicinity. Consequently, the officers left
the area and set up the surveillance outside the apartment building. Id. at 413. It seems,
therefore, that the officers subjectively believed that the apartment was unoccupied. One
officer testified a bit more ambiguously that he did not know whether anyone was in the
home. Segura, District Court Memorandum, supra note 42, at 12 (citing testimony at the
suppression hearing in the district court at Tr. 394-96). The Second Circuit reasoned that
"the agents had no reason to believe anyone was inside the apartment." 663 F.2d at 413.
Nonetheless, that court inconsistently seems to indicate the officers believed, albeit unrea-
sonably, that the room was occupied. Id. at 417. The officers' departure from the third floor,
however, seems to belie this.
72. Id. at 417.
73. Id.
74. In a previous case, the Second Circuit permitted admission of evidence although the
agents illegally entered the living quarters because the room was unoccupied. United States
v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 335-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
75. For the first time, on such appeal, the petitioners claimed that the search warrant was
invalid, due to misrepresentations made in the application, apparently including the failure
of the government to inform the magistrate of the illegal entry. Segura v. United States,
Nos. 82-1062 & 82-1064, at 30-31 (2d Cir. June 29, 1982) (available in Joint App., supra note
42). This claim was rejected because of petitioners' failure to raise it earlier. Id. at 31.
Petitioners attempted to raise the issue in their joint petition to the Supreme Court. Joint
Petition, supra note 51, at 2. The Supreme Court, however, did not agree to consider this
question. Segura v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1182 (1983).
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should only grant hearings.where "there are special and important
reasons."7 6 Especially at a time when the Court is so heavily bur-
dened 7 7 the justices should only hear cases which raise substantial
constitutional questions of social importance, or involve substan-
tial conflict among the lower courts 78 and then only if such cases
reach the Court in a procedural and adversarial context which per-
mits the justices to tackle the questions in a relatively straightfor-
ward fashion.
In the realm of criminal procedure, and most particularly in the
area of fourth amendment jurisprudence, however, the Burger
Court appears remarkably inclined to take an activist, rather than
a cautious, approach. 9 It proceeds in much the same manner as
the Warren Court, albeit with different; even opposite, motives.
The justices' voracious appetite for constitutional adjudication of
criminal cases has resulted not only in exceedingly intricate fourth
amendment case law,80 but also has enticed the Court to invite the
76. Sup. CT. R. 17.1.
77. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
78. Supreme Court Rule 17.1 speaks to the considerations governing review on certiorari.
Certiorari is appropriate when a "conflict" exists among the federal circuits or among state
courts on a federal question, or when the lower court "has decided an important question of
federal law which has not been but should be settled by this Court." Sup. CT. R. 17.1(c).
Given their workload, however, I conclude that the justices should be even more cautious
than the rule requires. If lower court "conflict" is at issue, such conflict should be substan-
tial. An isolated disagreement does not merit hearing.
79. For the statistics on the opinions delivered by the Court in the field of criminal law or
procedure, see supra notes 18-20, 29-37 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens has com-
mented more than once on this matter. He criticizes the Court for "peering" over the shoul-
ders of state-court judges when fourth amendment matters are at issue. Florida v. Meyers,
104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984). He is especially upset that the Court seems more inclined to
vindicate the will of the majority than to protect individual rights and that it has done so
summarily in a number of cases. Id.. For Justice Steven's comments, see Florida v. Meyers,
104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Leon, 104 S.
Ct. 3430, 3450-57 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in No. 182-963 and dis-
senting in No. 82-1771); N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (speech before the American
Bar Association) ("my present colleagues' enthusiastic attempts to codify the law. . . decid-
ing the cases that come before them" involves "casting judicial restraint aside in an effort to
move the law to the right"). Justice Blackmun, too, has been quoted as having critized the
Court for going "where it wants to go. . .by hook or by crook" and for "deciding more than
the case requires." Barbash & Kamen,-supra note 28, at 33, col. 1.
80. Professor LaFave expends 2253 pages, excluding the quickly enlarging three pocket
parts, to summarize the law of the fourth amendment in his monumental treatise, W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978). Much of this law is highly intricate. Thus, in United
States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984), a fairly simple factual event-the opening of a
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parties to litigate issues not originally raised in their petitions.81
Segura is a classic example of the problem. It is a disaster that
need not have occurred. Although some minor division among the
circuits existed regarding questions of the dissipation of taint in
circumstances such as those present here, 2 Segura came to the
Court in both factually and legally undesirable condition for useful
review. Even an activist court should have denied certiorari in this
case.
Most disturbingly, the problems with the case were, or should
have been, evident to the justices from the parties' briefs on the
joint petition for certiorari.8 3 The most important issues and sub-
issues were never before the Court, or they reached the Court with-
out adequate, hardly "comprehensive," briefing. Powerful argu-
mentation was not in the cards. Little new law was possible; what
new law the Court could make was likely to be undermined by the
factual context of the case. A busy court decided to render a deci-
sion likely, by its very nature, to be flawed. The seeds were sown
for poor development of fourth amendment jurisprudence.
damaged package by a private partf, and then its reopening and chemical testing of the
contents by a government agent-requires careful analysis of whether the reopening was a
"search" and whether the additional movement of the contents, and the chemical testing of
a small quantity of the contents, was a "search," a "seizure," or both. The final question, of
course, was whether warrants were required for any of these events.
81. E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting from grant of
certiorari). In this case, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's request that the parties brief
and argue a question they did not bring before the Court as follows:
Evidently unable or unwilling to decide the question presented by the parties,
the Court, instead of dismissing the writ. . . as improvidently granted, orders
reargument directed to the questions that [petitioners] decided not to bring
here. .. . Thus, in this nonadversarial context, the Court has decided to
plunge into the merits of the fourth amendment issues despite the fact that no
litigant . . . wants the Court's guidance on these questions.
Id.; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
82. The Second Circuit decision in Segura conflicted with the taint analysis in United
States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980), and to some extent with the analysis in
United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974). Segura also conflicted with three state
decisions: State v. Dorson, 62 Hawaii 377, 615 P.2d 740 (1980); State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d
467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978); and People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr.
83 (1975).
83. If the problems were not evident to the justices at this time, the government's subse-
quent brief on the writ certainly would have put them on notice that the writ was improvi-
dently granted.
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B. Finding Issues
In August 1982, Segura and Colon raised the following issue in
their joint petition for certiorari:
Whether the introduction into evidence of contraband seized af-
ter a 19-hour hiatus between the illegal entry into and seizure of
petitioners' dwelling and the obtaining of a search warrant vio-
lates the Constitutional requirement that a magistrate find
probable cause and issue a warrant before the police violate the
privacy of the home? 4
Noting that the decision below conflicted with holdings of other
courts, 85 the petitioners called upon the high court to develop an
opinion that would deter "this kind of [egregious] activity."' 6
Surely a civil libertarian could be deeply troubled by the govern-
ment officials' conduct in this case. They dragged Segura from the
site of his arrest to his apartment, apparently unconstitutionally
invaded his home and arrested the occupants, improperly searched
the building, and then occupied it for more than nineteen hours.
The Warren Court might well have accepted the petitioners' invi-
tation to condemn this behavior. Obviously, the Court should
strongly condemn egregious, unconstitutional government conduct.
But, was this case the proper vehicle for expressing such condem-
nation? And, perhaps more pragmatically, if the majority of jus-
tices who voted to grant hearing in this case did not intend to con-
demn the government, was this a suitable vehicle for creating new
law to protect such government activities?
Why would the Court grant hearing in this case? Putting aside
the peculiar facts of the case, the fact pattern fairly raised two
questions. First, under what circumstances may police secure
premises pending issuance of a search warrant? This unresolved
question is of no small importance to the police, and has perplexed
and troubled courts,87 including the high court,88 in the past. This
84. Joint Petition, supra note 51, at 1-2. A second issue was also raised. See supra note
75.
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. Joint Petition, supra note 51, at 10, 17.
87. Some courts assumed that external securing of premises, and exclusion of persons
from the premises, was valid, but these cases involved only the hypothetical presence of
persons already under arrest, or subject to immediate arrest. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note
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issue can, however, arise in a number of factual contexts. Police
may secure premises from within a home, or from without. The
premises secured may be occupied. If they are, police may wish or
need to evict, detain, or keep under scrutiny the occupants. If the
premises are unoccupied, persons with a lawful possessory interest
in the home may never arrive, or they might come and demand
free access. What does the police officer do in each of these situa-
tions? Each of these questions ultimately requires Supreme Court
consideration. The precise legal questions that the Court would
have to confront, include: (a) whether the act of securing is a
"search" or "seizure"; (b) if it is either or both, whether it requires
"probable cause" or some lesser degree of certainty; (c) whether a
warrant is a prerequisite to such securing; (d) whether the answers
to (a) through (c) differ when the police occupy the premises from
80, § 6.5, at 451-52. Consequently, Professor LaFave considers a number of issues un-
resolved. Cases permitting internal securing, as here, exist, but LaFave notes that "convinc-
ing analogies [to established fourth amendment doctrine] are hard to come by." Id. at 453.
Professor LaFave considers the issues of securing premises important and largely un-
resolved. Id.
88. The facts in Segura are similar in many respects to Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970). Police officers arrested Vale on a drug charge, on the front steps outside his house,
then took him into the house, and looked around it for possible occupants. When Vale's
relatives subsequently returned home, the officers conducted a full search of the house, and
seized evidence found in a rear bedroom. The Supreme Court of Louisiana justified the
search as one incident to Vale's lawful arrest, but the Supreme Court rejected that theory.
The Court considered the government's claim that the search was valid on the ground that
the officers needed to enter in order to reduce the risk that anyone on the premises might
dispose of contraband before a search warrant could be obtained. The Court responded am-
biguously to this argument. It rejected the entry because no exigent circumstances existed to
justify a warrantless entry, observing both that the government failed to demonstrate that
contraband was in the process of destruction, and that in any event the arresting officers
had checked the house and found nobody inside. The opinion could be interpreted implic-
itly to permit securing of premises. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 80, § 6.5(a), at 435. Justice
Black's dissent in Vale expressed concern, however, that the Court's decision would require
police to leave the premises to obtain a search warrant. 399 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
The result in Vale, however, was correctly described by LaFave as "baffling" and "curi-
ous," and hopefully not "the last word from the Court on this important issue." 2 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 80, § 6.5(a), at 435-36. This case might, at first glance, have served as
the Court's next word on this issue.
The similarity of Vale to Segura was not lost on the Segura parties. Petitioners argued in
the principal case that "misapplication of the 'independent soirce' exception to the exclu-
sionary rule would result in an overruling of Vale." Brief of Petitioners on the Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 21 n.5, United States v. Segura, Nos. 82-1062, 82-1064 (2d Cir. June 29, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Petitioners' Brief].
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within, rather than secure them from without; and (e) what au-
thority the government possesses, when it secures premises, re-
garding the lawful occupants or would-be occupants."9
Second, the general facts implicate a Wong Sun90 issue-what
effect, if any, does a valid search warrant have on evidence tainted
by a previous illegal search? The scope-even the legitimacy-of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is surely one of great sig-
nificance, and is a matter about which this Court has expressed
frequent recent concern.9' The effect of the Wong Sun doctrine is
to expand, not to restrict, the rule's scope. Recently, the Court has
considered whether, and how, acts of free will by witnesses to
crime,92 and by suspects,93 can untaint subsequently obtained evi-
dence causally tied to earlier illegalities. The Court could use a
case like Segura to consider the effect of a hypothetical free will
decision by a suspect to destroy seizable evidence. The Court could
decide whether the existence of a constitutionally valid search war-
rant always, never, or sometimes, renders untainted evidence
which the police originally legally found and subsequently seized.
C. The Issue of Securing the Premises
Despite the social importance of the issues, there are four rea-
sons why the justices should have realized in advance that they
could not properly use this case as a vehicle for considering the
"securing" question.
89. This latter question, in turn, requires analysis of the nature of the government con-
duct vis a vis the person: is it a "seizure" of the person to evict or to detain or to keep under
surveillance such person; and if it is, what level of suspicion is required? For a discussion of
the securing issue, see generally 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 80, § 6.5(a)-(c), at 432-55.
90. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), is the leading case regarding the
effect of an unconstitutional search or seizure upon subsequently seized evidence. I use the
case named as shorthand for this general issue.
91. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984) (exclusionary rule inap-
plicable in good-faith, warranted searches); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)
(same exception in federal context); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) ("inevitable
discovery" exception to fourth amendment permitted); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268 (1978) (scope of taint limited).
92. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).




It takes little prescience to realize that if Segura was intended as
a vehicle to consider this question, it was because four or more
justices wanted to justify such police conduct. If so, the obvious
question is, why would they choose this case? It is hard to imagine
a case less factually attractive. First, this case does not deal with
the securing of unoccupied premises from without, but rather deals
with the securing of occupied premises from within. Second, this is
not a case, like Chimel,e4 where the police were, at least appar-
ently, lawfully within the premises. Rather, Segura is more like
Vale,95 but perhaps worse.96 Third, Segura involves more than a
mere momentary occupation of the home. Nineteen hours passed.
Finally, the extended occupation was not easily or attractively ex-
plained. At best, there was a significant, largely unexplained, delay
in the judicial system. Worse, government laziness in applying for
the warrant might have been involved. At worst, disinterest by the
United States Attorney in the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment to the Constitution could explain the delay. Making
matters even worse for the justices who wished to justify the con-
duct here, the government implicitly admitted after the Court
granted certiorari that the delay was due to laziness or
disinterest.97
2. Was the Issue Before the Court?
It is not clear that the question of securing the premises as a
fourth amendment issue was properly before the Court. In the
courts below, the government argued that the initial entry was law-
ful. Both courts disagreed. At no time did either court justify-or,
for that matter, even reject--"securing" as such. At the Supreme
Court, however, the government apparently changed its position,
although it did so in less than straightforward fashion. The Solici-
tor General's brief on the petition for certiorari generally treated
the entry as illegal, framing its position instead solely as a Wong
94. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
95. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). For a discussion of Vale, see supra note 88.
96. Here, the entry into the house was at night, forcible, and involved the unlawful arrest
of four occupants of the premises.
97. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Sun claim.98 "Securing," as an issue, was not raised. Yet, the Solic-
itor General dropped a footnote contending that "the court of ap-
peals' conclusion [that the entry was unlawful] . . . is open to seri-
ous question. . . ."99 It recommended that the Court grant hearing
in another specified case then docketed with the Court,100 and in
which the government had petitioned for certiorari, because "it is
possible that the Court will not find occasion to resolve the ['Wong
Sun issue'] if it grants review in this case."'10
Implicit in the government's position was that the justices might
want to reach the entry question, even though the government no
longer contested it. The only way, however, the Court could reach
the "securing" issue would be to attack both lower courts' conclu-
sion that the entry was unlawful, and, furthermore, to do so de-
spite the apparent unwillingness of the Solicitor General to make
such a claim;0 2 otherwise it would have to separate the unlawful
entry from the subsequent occupation. Yet, again, the government
brief made no such claim; it did not even hint at such an
argument.10 3
98. Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5,
United States v. Segura, Nos. 82-1062, 82-1064 (2d Cir. June 29, 1982) (the "illegal entry did
not cause the later discovery of the evidence ... ; hence, that evidence was not a
'fruit'. . . . See, e.g., Wong sun . ) [hereinafter cited as Brief in Opposition].
99. Id. at 6 n.3.
100. United States v. Crozier, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984). The Court did not follow the Solici-
tor General's recommendation. Rather, after Segura was decided, the Court granted certio-
rari in Crozier, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for "fur-
ther consideration in light of Segura" and two other cases. Id.
101. Brief in Opposition, supra note 98, at 6 n.3.
102. Willingness to reach issues in such circumstances would not be unique, however. See
supra note 81, and accompanying text.
103. Subsequently, the government's brief on the writ did raise the securing issue and the
government did defend such actions. Respondent's Brief, supra note 56, at 7. It was done in
the context of assuming both that the entry was unlawful, id. at 12 n.6, and that securing is
a seizure, id. at 7. See generally infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text. To follow this
new strategy, the government had to separate the entry from the occupation, and the gov-
ernment seems only to argue that an external securing is appropriate. Respondent's Brief,
supra note 56, at 21 ("That does not mean that the officers were entitled to enter the apart-
ment . . . , but it does mean that they were permitted to station themselves in a place
where they had a right to be and prevent persons from entering the apartment .. "); id.
at 22 n.14 (distinguishing external from internal securing). Despite this argument, the gov-
ernment still claimed that the "question presented is not one of substantive Fourth Amend-
ment law, but rather simply one of remedy. . . ." Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). Thus, the
government apparently still viewed the only real issue to be one of taint.
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3. What Subissues Were Before the Court?
Even if the "securing" question was somehow properly before
the Court, consider the context in which it was raised. First, the
government assumed arguendo the unlawfulness of the entry.10 4
Second, the Court had to decide whether such occupation was a
"seizure." This matter was of paramount legal significance, be-
cause, if the occupation of the premises was not a "seizure," it falls
entirely outside the proscription of the fourth amendment. This
reasoning may be a disturbing way for the Court to decide matters
of such great concern, 105 but it is now the correct mode of analy-
104. Respondent's Brief, supra note 56, at 12 n.6.
105. By concluding that an occupation was not a seizure, the Court can preempt the im-
portant process of weighing the government action against the citizen's interests in privacy
in his person and control of his property, in order to decide if the conduct is a "reasonable
search or seizure."
The Court does not always appear to be sensitive to the distinction between concluding
that conduct is not a seizure and finding that the conduct constitutes a seizure but is a
reasonable one. In United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), police placed an electronic
surveillance device in an ether can. The Court said, "[o]f course, if the presence of a beeper
in the can constituted a seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it would follow
that the presence of any object, regardless of its nature, would violate the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 3302. A fourth amendment violation does not necessarily follow, however. To
conclude that the beeper's, or any other object's, presence on or in a person's property is a
"seizure," would only mean that a constitutional issue is raised. It does not mean that all or
any such seizures are unreasonable, and therefore constitutionally violative. Even if all in-
stallations of all devices are to be treated alike, it would be preferable to analyze explicitly
the competing interests, and forthrightly conclude that all such seizures are either reasona-
ble or unreasonable, rather than to define away the issue by pretending it is not a "seizure."
At times the Court conducts the balancing process at the initial stage of deciding whether
the governmental activity implicates the fourth amendment. At least in the realm of
"searches," the Court recently balanced interests to conclude that prison cell searches are
not "searches" in the constitutional sense. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). (At
times it is linguistically difficult to describe the activity in any way other than as a "search,"
even if it is not one in fourth amendment terms.) The problem with the Court's approach,
however, is evident from the facts of the case. The inmate claimed prison officials invaded
his cell merely to harrass him. Because the case reached the Court on summary judgment,
this claim must be accepted as true. When the Supreme Court concluded that prison
searches are not "searches"--because ordinarily the interests of society in prison security
supersede those of the inmate-the harassment loses fourth amendment constitutional sig-
nificance. It would seem far better to conclude that when prison guards walk into an in-
mate's cell, and look in and under all of its contents, that this is a "search," that usually the
legitimate interests of the prison officials renders such searches reasonable, but that this
"search," if based on harassment, was unreasonable. Collapsing the second issue-the rea-
sonableness of the search-into the first-whether the activity was a search in the constitu-
tional sense-does not permit this approach.
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sis. 0 6 The government did argue below that no seizure occurred
until the search warrant was executed. The court of appeals made
short shrift of this point.107 By the time the case reached the Su-
preme Court, however, the Solicitor General again backed down.
Without conceding the point-indeed it made a half-hearted argu-
ment in a footnote' 08-the government assumed arguendo that the
occupation was a "seizure" of all 'of the contents of the apart-
ment.10 9 In short, the "occupation" issue, not apparently before the
court," 0 and present in a highly unattractive factual context,"'
was also in a legally undesirable context. The two initial is-
sues-the possible illegitimacy of the entry, and the nature of se-
curing as a "seizure"-were not before the Court. They both were
assumed arguendo.
Third, the Second Circuit's affirmance of the district court's sup-
pression of the evidence observed in plain view in the home further
complicated matters. This issue, too, was not before the Court.
Again, the Solicitor General changed his legal position, and did not
object in the Supreme Court to the exclusion of the evidence." 2
Neither lower court opinion explains how the items, especially
those in the closet, came into "plain view." The district court said
they were "turned up,"" 3 perhaps implying that the.items might
not have been so evidently in view. The court of appeals merely
said that during the "limited inspection," the police "discovered
them.""14 The problem is, however, that once the government ac-
cepted the legitimacy of the exclusion of this evidence, which fol-
lowed from its assumption that the entry was unlawful, and from
its further assumption that the occupation was a seizure of all of
the contents in the apartment, they left themselves without a com-
pelling principled argument for distinguishing between the two
106. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 80 § 9.2(g), at 46.
107. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
108. Respondent's Brief, supra note 56, at 16 n.9.
109. Id. at 14-16.
110. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
112. Respondent's Brief, supra note 56, at 6 (identifying the issue as dealing with "evi-
dence discovered pursuant to a valid search warrant") (emphasis added). See generally
Brief in Opposition, supra note 98.
113. Segura, District Court Memorandum, supra note 42, at 11.
114. United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1981).
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categories of seized evidence. Both seizures were probably reasona-
ble, or both were unreasonable.115
Thus, the "non-issue" issue reached the Court as follows: it was
"asked" whether, assuming that the entry was unlawful, and fur-
ther assuming that the premises and all of the items therein were
seized, and, still further assuming the inadmissibility of the items
observed after the illegal entry of the apartment and seizure of the
contents therein, were the remaining items of evidence similarly
seized, nonetheless admissible? If the context in which the issue
reached the Court is confounding, surely its principled resolution
promised to command little intellectual support.
4. Decision in the Shadow of the "Taint" Issue.
Finally, considerable danger existed that any discussion by the
Court of the securing issue would end up as dictum. After all, if
despite all the problems noted above, the Court chose to hold the
occupation lawful, the assumed illegality of the entry remained.
Thus, a problem of taint necessarily would exist. Even if the Court
declared the occupation unlawful, it nevertheless might admit the
evidence on Wong Sun principles, on the ground that their subse-
quent seizure was not causally tied to the initial illegalities.116
D. The Issue of Taint
Segura was an entirely inappropriate vehicle for considering the
very important question of securing of premises. If this case de-
served the attention of an overly burdened Court, only the
Wong Sun 7 matter warranted their attention. Taint surely was a
problem. Indeed, that issue occupied most of the lower courts'
opinions and the government's initial brief. Perhaps certiorari
could properly have been granted because at least a minor conflict
did exist among lower courts regarding this matter of constitu-
115. For further discussion of this problem as it relates to the issue of securing, see infra
notes 213-16 and accompanying text; for discussion of this problem as it relates to the ulti-
mate taint issue, see infra note 229 and accompanying text.
116. Regarding the pertinent law on this matter, see infra notes 120-21, 141, and accom-
panying text.
117. See supra note 90.
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tional significance.11 The question here, however, is not one of
power but of propriety. Why would a busy court take this case to
consider the Wong Sun issue? Let us put the matter in
perspective.
First, granting the general importance of the taint doctrine to
the administration of criminal justice, one may question how often
this particular type of fact pattern occurs. That is, how often do
the police illegally enter a home they apparently believe is unoccu-
pied, solely so they can secure it, unexpectedly find lawful occu-
pants, illegally arrest these occupants, remain on the premises
while waiting for a search warrant, and then obtain a completely
untainted search warrant? It happens, but one may wonder how
often? 1" 9
Second, basic Wong Sun law is rather straightforward. Tainted
evidence must be suppressed; when the taint is dissipated, it may
be introduced into evidence. 20 No matter how unlawful the gov-
ernment conduct, or how many times the government violates the
law, taint is absent if there is an independent source for the dis-
covery, i.e. no causal connection between the illegality and the sub-
sequent evidence seized.' 2 ' This law is basic and ancient, and
neither disputed nor presently controversial. Certainly it did not
require the Court's time to repeat.
Third, the district court concluded that there was a causal con-
nection, suggesting that had the police acted constitutionally, Co-
lon might well have destroyed the evidence. The Second Circuit
rejected this finding as speculative. Once a court proceeds to con-
sider the question of causation, however, it becomes one of fact.
The relevant law is clear, and the application of that law to the
facts is hardly one that merited the Court's attention.
One cannot say for sure why the Court felt Segura merited its
118. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
119. All of these factual circumstances are important. The police in situations such as
Segura are now apt to come armed with arrest warrants. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980). They thus would have a basis to enter the home lawfully. Or, if they have a
reasonable basis to believe the accused narcotics violators and the contraband are in the
house, they will have a much stronger case for entry. But see supra note 88. Once the police
are lawfully in the house, the taint issue is gone.
120. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 477-88 (1963).
121. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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attention on the matter of taint. But, unless the Court intended to
spend its time on a merely factual disagreement between the
courts below, there seems only one possible basis for the Court's
review-to create new law, beyond the causation issue.122 Namely,
the Court may have wished to reach the allegedly "prudentially
unsound" analysis of the district court. That is, even if we assume
a causal connection, the Court could decide whether the execution
of a valid search warrant always, never, or sometimes, serves to
untaint the evidence originally come upon in the previous
illegality.123
Putting aside the merits of any rule which would flow from this
litigation, however, Segura still was not an ideal avenue for making
any such law. As with the issue of securing, the accepted exclusion
of the "plain view" evidence presents conceptual difficulties.124 The
government argued, in essence, that there was an illegal entry, and
that there were two seizures of all of the contents, once when the
home was entered, and then again when the warrant was executed.
Why, then, would one set of seizures after an illegal entry be dis-
tinguished from another set?12 , Unless the justices were prepared
with a principled distinction, the Court should have waited for a
case in which no plain view sighting occurred, 26 where all items
122. These facts arguably triggered one legally unsolved issue regarding the scope of the
exclusionary rule: the applicability of the "inevitable discovery" doctrine, i.e. whether taint
may be dissipated upon evidence that the government would have developed an indepen-
dent source, even though, in fact, it did come upon the evidence as a result of the primary
illegality. The court apparently did not consider this case the vehicle by which to resolve
that question, however. It granted certiorari in another case, already docketed, which more
directly, explicitly, and attractively raised that issue. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501
(1984). The Court's decision in Nix, upholding the doctrine, was announced less than a
month before its decision in Segura. Id. at 2501.
123. A comparable issue, previously resolved by the Court, concerned the significance of
Miranda warnings in untainting a subsequent confession obtained shortly after an illegal
arrest. The Court concluded that such warnings were a factor, but no more than a factor, in
dissipation of the taint. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
124. Moreover, the Solicitor General warned the Court, in its response to the petition,
that the Wong Sun issue might be mooted because the illegality here-the entry-was a
"close issue." Brief in Opposition, supra note 98, at 6 n.3; see supra notes 98-101 and ac-
companying text.
125. For discussion of the possibility of any such principled distinction, see infra note 229
and accompanying text.
126. For example, such a situation would be where external securing of premises occurred.
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ultimately seized were first sighted in plain view,127 where plain
view sighting occurred but the lower courts treated alike all the
ultimately seized evidence, or where the evidence was treated dif-
ferently, but the parties argued against such a distinction.
E. Summary
In short, this case came to the Court in an unenviable procedural
context. The important issue of securing premises was not in an
appropriate environment for resolution. Although the case did
raise a Wong Sun issue, the legal issue came to the Court in incon-
sistent fashion. One cannot say that the Court had no authority to
hear Segura, for it surely did. One can say, however, that in light
of the state of the record and the Court's heavy schedule, the
Court probably should have denied certiorari. The Court could
have averted a nearly certain disaster.
V. SUPREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court granted Segura and Colon's petition for writ
of certiorari on February 22, 1983.128 Oral arguments were held on
November 9, 1983. The opinion of the Court was not announced,
however, until July 5, 1984, the final day of the 1983 Court term, in
the awe-inspiring flurry129 of decisions announced near the end of
the term.
Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined all but
Part IV of the opinion. Chief Justice Burger explained in the first
sentence of the opinion why the Court chose to hear the case: "We
granted certiorari to decide whether, because of an earlier illegal
entry, the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence
seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search
warrant which was issued on information obtained by the police
127. It appears that United States v. Crozier, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984), docketed with the
Court at the same time as Segura, was such a case. The government, in its brief on the
petition in Segura, recommended to the Court that it grant hearing in Crozier, rather than
in Segura. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
128. Segura, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983).
129. During the period of June 4 through July 5, 1984, 61 decisions were announced. 52
U.S.L.W. 4681-5198 (1984). Of this number, nineteen were announced in the last three days
of the Court term. Id. at 5051-98.
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before the entry into the residence." 130
Part I of Segura is apparently131. three paragraphs long. Noting
that the opinion purposely is limited, the justices identified two
separate questions which they believed required resolution: first,
whether entry and internal securing of premises constitutes an im-
permissible seizure of all the contents of the apartment, "seen and
unseen"; and second, whether evidence first discovered during the
later, warranted search should be suppressed as the fruit of the
initial illegal entry. 132
In light of the poor context in which this case reached the Court,
Chief Justice Burger identified what was "not before us, and [for
which] we have no reason to question:' ' 33 namely, that the entry
without exigent circumstances was unlawful; and that the ensuing
search and observation of items in plain view was illegal.3 Addi-
tionally, perhaps because of the lack of significant briefing of the
issue, the Court avoided deciding specifically whether the securing
of the premises constituted a seizure. It assumed arguendo that it
did."'35 Having put aside these three issues, the Court then
presented its dual holdings:
Assuming that there was seizure of all the contents of the peti-
tioners' apartment when agents secured the premises from
within, that seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Spe-
cifically, we hold that where officers, having probable cause,
enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants
who have legitimate possessory interests in its contents and take
them into custody and, for no more than the period here in-
volved, secure the premises from within to preserve the status
quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a
warrant, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscrip-
130. Segura, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3382 (1984).
131. In the slip opinion, perhaps due to a printing error, the third paragraph is ambigu-
ously broken up, so that the first and second sentences thereto are separated by spacing that
could imply that the latter sentence was intended as a fourth paragraph (though it is not
indented). Segura, No. 82-5298 slip op., at 2; see also 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3383 (1984).
132. 104 S. Ct. at 3382.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 3383. The Court reiterated these "non-isues" elsewhere. See infra notes 138-39
and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 3382.
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tion against unreasonable seizure.13 6
On the matter of taint, the Court concluded that the illegal en-
try had no ultimate bearing on the second question:
[W]e hold that the evidence discovered during the subsequent
search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid
search warrant issued wholly on information known to the of-
ficers before the entry into the apartment need not have been
suppressed as "fruit" of the illegal entry because the warrant
and the information of which it was based were unrelated to the
entry and therefore constituted an independent source for the
evidence .... 137
Part H of the opinion merely summarizes the facts and describes
the lower courts' analysis of the issues. The Court repeated its ear-
lier assertion that the lawfulness of the entry and the admissibility
of the items sighted in plain view were not before it because the
government, "although it does not concede the correctness of [the
lower courts'] holding, does not [now] contest it ... "138
Part III commences with the Court's third disclaimer regarding
the "narrow and precise question now before us."'139 With the entry
and plain view sighting put aside, the only issue was "whether
drugs and the other items not observed during the initial entry and
first discovered by the agents the day after the entry, under an
admittedly valid search warrant, should have been suppressed.' 40
The remainder of Part III is a short, uncontroversial statement of
the pertinent law regarding tainted evidence, and of the fact that
"it is clear from our prior holdings that 'the exclusionary rule has
no application [where] the Government learned of the evidence
"from an independent source."' ",4
Part IV of the opinion for the first time turns to an explanation
of the reasoning behind the Court's first holding described in Part
I. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor signed this por-
136. Id. at 3382-83.
137. Id. at 3383 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920)).
138. Id. at 3385 n.4.
139. Id. at 3385.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3386.
[Vol. 26:375
JUDICIAL MISCRAFTSMANSHIP
tion of the opinion, however. In the slip opinion, Part IV has a
Part A, but no Part B.142 Later, the "A" was deleted from the West
Publishing Company's published version. 43
The two justices noted that Segura and Colon argued that the
government's entry and act of securing the premises constituted a
"seizure" of the contents of the apartment. The two justices ob-
served that this argument was "plainly"'144 intended to avoid the
"independent source" exception. 45 Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded, however, that such an argument was ir-
relevant; even if the occupation was a seizure, the seizure was not
an unreasonable one given the totality of the circumstances.'"
The two justices conceded that no precedent for this ruling ex-
isted, although they found implied support from two previous
cases-Rawlings v. Kentucky147 and Mincey v. Arizona'48-from
the words of "a distinguished constitutional scholar"' 4 in a 1969
article,150 and from language in Justice Black's dissent in Vale v.
Louisiana.5"
Chief Justice Burger also conceded that "arguably, the wiser
course"'152 would have been for the police to secure the premises
externally. Although this wiser course existed, he deemed it consti-
tutionally irrelevant that they instead entered the apartment. He
stressed the difference between "searches," which protect privacy,
and "seizures," which implicate possessory interests in property.
Although the entry here may have constituted an illegal search,
142. Segura, Slip Op. at 9, 52 U.S.L.W. 5130-33 (1984).
143. 104 S. Ct. at 3386. One can assume, therefore, that the official version of the opinion,
published in the United States Reports, will be in corrected form.
144. Id.
145. Id. The theory would be that the evidence seized in the occupation must be sup-
pressed as primary, not tainted secondary evidence, seized directly as the result of the ille-
gality. Id. The second seizure would be irrelevant. The Court conceded that the direct re-
sults of unconstitutional searches or seizures must be suppressed. Id. This conclusion
derives from the reasoning that such evidence must be poisoned since it is actually part of
the tree, not part of the fruit that falls from it.
146. Id. at 3386-87.
147. 448 U.S. 98 (1980), cited in 104 S. Ct. at 3388.
148. 437 U.S. 385 (1978), cited in 104 S. Ct. at 3388.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 3388 n.7.
150. Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969-Is it a Means Or An End?, 29 MD. L. REV. 307
(1969), cited in 104 S. Ct. at 3388 n.7.
151. 399 U.S. 30, 36-41 (1970), cited in 104 S. Ct. at 3389 n.7.
152. 104 S. Ct. at 3389.
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requiring suppression of the evidence observed in plain view, the
act of securing the premises was at most a "seizure," of which the
possessory interests of Segura and Colon were equally invaded
whether the seizure was conducted from without or from within." 3
The seizure was a reasonable one, the two justices reasoned, be-
cause seizures generally are less intrusive than searches, and be-
cause the governmental interest in discovering and preventing de-
struction of incriminating evidence is great.154 Citing three cases,
with emphasis on Chambers v. Maroney, 55 the justices concluded
that warrantless seizures of property based on probable cause fre-
quently are permitted for the time necessary to secure a warrant in
order to conduct the more intrusive search. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice O'Connor defended their rule from the claim that it
would increase the likelihood of illegal entries such as this one,
noting inter alia that "officers who enter illegally will recognize
that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry
may be suppressed,"' 56 as it was here.
The two justices conceded that a reasonable seizure could be-
come unreasonable as a result of the duration of the seizure "or
[for] other reasons."'' 57 They found no problem here: the agents ac-
ted in good faith because the delay "in a large metropolitan center
unfortunately is not uncommon";' 58 the officers spent time giving
priority to processing Segura, Colon, and the others arrested; there
was no evidence that the agents in the house exploited their pres-
ence; and finally, Segura and Colon were under arrest and in cus-
tody, so the "possessory interests in the apartment and its con-
tents was virtually non-existent."' 59 Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor distinguished United States v. Place,60 in which
a ninety-minute detention of luggage was deemed unreasonable be-
cause that case involved a seizure upon mere reasonable suspicion,
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3387.
155. 399 U.S. 42 (1970), cited in 104 S. Ct. at 3387. The other cases cited on the point
were United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979).




160. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
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not upon probable cause. Once the probable cause in Place was
established, the luggage was not opened for three days, although it
"was not suggested that this delay presented an independent basis
for suppression of the evidence eventually discovered."1"1
Part V of the opinion returns to the "fruit" issue. The five jus-
tices repeated their holding of Part I, based on the law described
in Part III, concluding that an independent source "for the discov-
ery of the evidence" existed-the valid search warrant. The jus-
tices noted that the "vast majority of federal court [sic] of appeals
have held that evidence obtained pursuant to a valid warrant
search need not be excluded because of a prior illegal entry." '162
Had the police merely followed the "wiser course" of securing from
the outside, the same evidence ultimately would have been seized.
Thus, the illegality of the initial entry was causally irrelevant. The
"but for" connection, a necessary precondition to taint, was absent.
Would not Colon, or others, have destroyed the evidence but for
the illegal entry? The Supreme Court first observed that the peti-
tioners now made no such claim, and then it accepted in full the
Second Circuit's reasoning that the possibility of destruction was
speculative and, more importantly, that the district court's ruling
was "prudentially unsound.' ' 6 3 The Court declined "to extend the
exclusionary rule, which already exacts an enormous price . . . to
further 'protect' criminal activity.' 64 The Court was reminded "of
Justice Jackson's warning that 'sophisticated argument may prove
a causal connection'. . . and his admonition that the courts should
consider whether 'as a matter of good sense . . . such connection
may become too attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' ,,e This lan-
guage from the Slip Opinion was later revised to give proper credit
for the quote to Justice Frankfurter. 6 6 The Court concluded that
the "essence of the dissent is that there is some 'constitutional
161. 104 S. Ct. at 3390 n.8.
162. Id. at 3391 n.9.
163. Id. at 3392. This is another reason why the Court should not have heard this case:
without this claim the remainder of their discussion was irrelevant.
164. Id.
165. United States v. Segura, 52 U.S.L.W. 5127, 5133 (U.S. July 5, 1984).
166. The revision is found in 104 S. Ct. at 3392. Presumably, the official version of the
opinion will be corrected, too. The dissent made the same error, and even incorrectly identi-
fied the "Jackson" opinion as a dissent. United States v. Segura, 52 U.S.L.W. 5140 n.31
(U.S. July 5, 1984). This error, too, was corrected. 104 S. Ct. at 3404 n.31.
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right' to destroy evidence. This concept defies both logic and com-
mon sense." 167 Apparently, although the Court does not say so di-
rectly, the taint is dissipated as a matter of law, even if a causal tie
could arguably be made, if the only claim of causation is predi-
cated on a theory of destruction of evidence by the defendants or,
perhaps, by their cohorts.
Part VI is two sentences long, merely affirming the judgment
and agreeing with the court of appeals regarding the admission of
the evidence in question.16 8
Justice Stevens dissented for himself and three others. He con-
cluded that the act of securing was clearly both a "search"' 9 and a
"seizure,' 17 0 and that the act was unreasonable because of its dura-
tion. 7 1 He maintained that the search warrant did not "untaint"
the evidence seized. Not only was destruction of evidence plausi-
ble, but Stevens rejected the majority justices' view that suppres-
sion was prudentially unsound.'7 2 In his view, the government
agents' conduct was "blatantly" unconstitutional, 173 and the
"Court's rhetoric cannot disguise the fact that. . . it not only tol-
erates, but provides an affirmative incentive for warrantless and
plainly unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into the
home ... .
VI. Segura AS A JUDICIAL OPINION
One can criticize the Segura opinion from a number of perspec-
tives. First, one can criticize the results on the merits from any one
of a number of policy or analytical perspectives. 75 Second, one can
167. 104 S. Ct. at 3392.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 3394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. "Id. at 3395.
171. Id. at 3394-97.
172. Id. at 3400-03.
173. Id. at 3404.
174. Id. The dissenters believed the record was inadequate to factually resolve the "de-
struction" question. It would have remanded the case for further proceedings on this ques-
tion. Id. at 3403.
175. For example, the policy implications of Segura, if it were binding law on the matter
of securing the premises, which it is not, see infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text,
would be staggering to civil libertarians. The message to the police is "Thou shall not enter
homes without a warrant," but that "Thou may occupy it without a warrant." The permissi-
bility of the latter virtually extinguishes the former prohibition.
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criticize the Court for its lack of candor in its description of the
facts. Chief Justice Burger initially wrote that the occupants of the
apartment "were taken to [DEAl headquarters,' ' .7  rather than
forthrightly indicating that they were arrested. More significantly,
Chief Justice Burger chose to accept the Second Circuit's charac-
terization of the nearly twenty-hour occupation as the result of
"administrative delay."' 177 Yet, the Solicitor General conceded that
the United States Attorney's office was to blame. 78 Perhaps the
justices felt a need to obscure the particularly unattractive factual
context with which they were working.
My objection here, however, is more basic. For the reasons
Also troubling is the place of "inevitability" in all of this. If the government can prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the agents would inevitably have discovered the evi-
dence, then the item seized is untainted. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984). A hypo-
thetical independent source is enough. Yet, what is good for the goose is not acceptable for
the gander. When the gander-the person charged with a crime-may be expected to de-
stroy evidence, then this inevitability must be ignored. The difference between the goose
and the gander surely is not logical. The explanation is that the former, but not the latter, is
clothed in a police uniform. Yet, the issue is "causation," a matter ordinarily of fact, not of
law. What happens if a defendant argues that her husband, not suspected of "criminal activ-
ity," might have destroyed evidence? Is this a case of goose, or of gander? Does it matter
why the husband would destroy it-because he is cleaning house, or because he is trying to
"save" his wife? When does he become clothed in a "criminal's uniform"? The claim that
there is no "constitutional right" to destroy evidence is a strawman. Nobody made such a
claim. Colon and the others in the apartment did have a constitutional right not to be ar-
rested, and Colon had the right not to have the home entered. The real issue is what should
be the evidentiary implication of these violations.
I also am troubled by the increasing analytical separation of the "search" from the
"seizure." Sometimes, such a distinction is plausible and even desirable. For example, in a
Terry stop and pat-down one must decide if the stop-i.e. seizure- was valid, and then
whether the pat-down-i.e. search-was correct. Often, such a distinction is undesirable,
however. You cannot easily-or, more importantly, commonsensically--divide up the entry
from the continued presence in the Segura-Colon apartment. The res gestae of the event
includes both. If the "entry" is a "search," the occupation is a continuing one. It is hard to
defend the "entry" as a possible search, but the "occupation" as only a seizure. At what
point does the entry become an occupation, so that a "search" becomes a "seizure"? Sup-
pose a blind police officer enters an unoccupied home and stays for 20 hours. Now there can
be no inadvertent search of the contents of the house. Must we now conclude that the con-
stitutional implications of this occupation is precisely the same as that on an external secur-
ing? My guess is that the average person would find such a result counterintuitive. See also
infra note 201 and accompanying text.
176. 104 S. Ct. at 3384.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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stated earlier, the case never should have been heard. 17 9 Once it
was heard, however, the legal community was entitled to a far bet-
ter judicial product than it received. The result of Segura was an
opinion not only inherently flawed but also unnecessarily weak. Al-
though one can only speculate as to the reasons for this result, the
most likely explanations flow from the Court's inappropriate rush
to reach issues not suitably before them, their fatigue, and the
time pressures caused by their heavy workload.
A. Structure of the Opinion
The Segura opinion provides ample evidence of a fatigued
Court, of a group of justices trying to finish its work in a hurry,
and, perhaps, of a Court putting more time into other, more "sig-
nificant" cases. The opinion surely demonstrates little concern for
structure.
The main opinion is structured oddly. There are six parts. Fre-
quently a court divides its opinion into severable sections in order
to make clearer to the reader the differences among justices, par-
ticularly when concurring opinions are drafted. Here, however,
there were no concurring opinions.
The poorest feature of the stucture is the unnecessary and self-
damaging division of the taint issue into two, nonconsecutive,
parts. Parts III and V deal exclusively with the taint question. The
former section provides the uncontroversial law; the latter section
applies it to the case here. Part IV, dealing with the "securing"
question, separates the two-part taint discussion. The opinion
would be developed more logically by placing its "securing" discus-
sion first,180 and then integrating into one section the two parts
which deal with "taint." The dissent expresses no criticism of the
basic taint law, so the majority's segregation of this law is inexplic-
able. There was also no need for Part VI. It could easily have been
included in Part V.
Finally, there is the intriguing presence of Part IVA of an opin-
ion lacking any Part IVB. Its presence in the Slip Opinion implies
an apparent last-moment reorganization of the opinion, or the de-
letion of a portion of the opinion. It also demonstrates the haste
179. See supra notes 76-127.
180. This assumes the inevitability of the discussion of this issue.
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with which the opinion reached its audience.
B. Securing the Premises (Part IV)
Earlier, I argued that the Court could not properly view this case
as a proper vehicle to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the
securing of the premises.181 And yet, the Court purported to reach
that issue. The result was predictably flawed; in addition, the re-
sult was worse than it had to be.
1. How not to Make an Issue of a Nonissue
The Court purports to declare new "hornbook" law regarding
the securing of premises. It does so, however, while ignoring the
essential point of departure in any analysis of a "seizure" ques-
tion-namely, whether the securing was, in fact, a seizure. Describ-
ing an assumed seizure as reasonable makes as much sense as argu-
ing that an assumed human is a male human, that "assuming X is
a student, she is a good student." This is not a case like Oliver v.
United States8 2 in which the Court, perhaps unnecessarily, pro-
vided two independent reasons to approve government conduct in
open fields-first, that such conduct is not a "search," and, second,
that open fields are not "persons, houses, papers, [or] effects." In
Segura, a seizure cannot be reasonable-or unreasonable, for that
matter-unless it is, first of all, a seizure.
More than logic is at issue. Unless government activity reaches
the stature of a "search" or a "seizure," no fourth amendment is-
sue is implicated. The issue, then, falls outside the confines of the
Constitution, in which case the Supreme Court has no reason to
rule on what is reasonable or unreasonable behavior, nor to tell
states what they cannot do.
Beyond logic and "jurisdiction," there is another reason why the
Court, inspired to make new law where none was requested by the
parties, should have confronted the "seizure" issue. Discussion
would have provided useful guidance to the legal community re-
garding the nature of the concept of "seizure" in the context of
personalty. The Court recently has demonstrated particular inter-
181. See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
182. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
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est in the subject. 183 The police and the courts would have benefit-
ted from a coherent discussion of this relatively new issue. Instead,
the justices provide no guidance. Worse yet, the opinion creates a
new, perhaps unintended, cloud over "seizure" law. The dissenters
claimed that prior cases "virtually compel"18 4 a finding of
"seizure." Are the dissenters wrong? Does the Court's grudging
treatment of the issue imply that there is more than meets the
eye? Or is Chief Justice Burger "simply" guilty of what the dis-
senters accuse him: reasoning so "parsimonious [that] .. .[it is as
if] he were preparing an adversary's brief. ..,?1s5
The justices would have been far less subject to criticism had
they given a "wrong" answer to the right question, instead of an-
swering the wrong question. Why did they do so? Probably the an-
swer is a result of the factors emphasized earlier. The issue of the
seizure was not properly framed. The lower courts never discussed
the issue seriously. The Solicitor General never raised it in his first
brief to the Court, and he relegated it to a mere footnote in his
later brief. Pressured by time and dulled by fatigue, the Court
seized the opportunity to avoid the problem and merely tracked
the Solicitor General's brief. The Court found itself trapped be-
tween its activist desire to make law, and its fatigue that cried out
for a simple, if not satisfactory, solution.
2. Questionable Use of Precedent'1 6
The Burger-O'Connor opinion misuses precedent and leaves
false impressions. Whether this is the result of inadequate time for
research, or something worse,187 is unclear.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984); United States v. Place,
103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). Previously, the meaning of the term "seizure" was relevant only with
respect to the detention of persons, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), or securing of
intangible objects such as conversations, see, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Until recently, Professor LaFave's observation was correct that "the word 'seizure' . . . has,
in the main, not been a source of difficulty." 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 80, § 2.1(a), at 221.
184. 104 S. Ct. at 3395 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 3396 n.12.
186. Criticism of the justices' use of prior case law necessarily skirts arguments which go
to the merits of the holding.
187. The Burger Court has been criticized before for "its unyielding determination to
reach the desired result [such that] the Court has too often resorted to distortion of the
record, disregard of the precedents, and an unwillingness honestly to explain or to justify its
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First, the justices' use of Chambers188 as the key precedent for
the crucial general proposition that seizures are less invasive than
searches is inexplicable. Rather than supporting their claim,
Chambers refutes it. If seizures are less intrusive than searches,
then it would follow that a warrantless seizure of a car, until a war-
rant can be obtained, followed by a warranted search, would be
preferred to a warrantless immediate search. However, not only
did the Court in Chambers view these issues as constitutionally
indistinguishable,189 but it even upheld a warrantless search after a
warrantless seizure.190  Chambers-a car case-simply did not
stand for the proposition for which it was used.191
Second, the justices' use of various other cases was disingenu-
ous. 192 They observed that Rawlings v. Kentucky"93 "did not ques-
tion the admissibility of evidence [internally secured],191 True, as
conclusions." Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. RaV. 99, 169.
See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HAv. L. Rav. 293 (1976); see
also Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle:
Proportionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L. J. 1063, 1089-98 (1981).
188. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
189. Id. at 52. This position in Chambers was inconsistent with an earlier pronouncement
of the Court. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969) (rejecting the claim
that a search after a seizure was "relatively minor," by saying that "we can see no reason
why, simply because some interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of move-
ment has lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed...").
190. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), also cited by the Court, do support their thesis. Both cases, however, went out of
their way to distinguish Chambers, on the ground that the latter involved a piece of prop-
erty-an automobile-subject to less privacy protection than the containers seized in the
instant cases. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 n.8; Arkansas v. Sanders, 422
U.S. at 765 n.14.
191. Ironically, if one accepts certain other reasoning by the two justices in Segura,
Chambers was improperly decided. Burger partially defends the Court's new rule by noting
that since Segura and Colon were under arrest, their possessory interest in the home and its
contents was "virtually non-existent." 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3390 (1984). Putting aside the fact
Burger bootstraps the illegal seizure of Colon into a basis for justifying the seizure of Co-
lon's home and contents, the reasoning here, applied to Chambers, would result in an inter-
esting conclusion. The occupants of the Chambers car were all under (proper) arrest. Their
possessory (i.e. seizure) interest in their automobile was "virtually non-existent." Their in-
terest in the automobile was a privacy (i.e. search) interest. Under these circumstances, it
would seem that a warrant to search the automobile was required.
192. Others have made the same criticism regarding the Burger Court's use of case law.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text; see also the Court's disingenuous description of
the facts in Segura, at supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
193. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
194. 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3388 (1984).
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far as the statement goes. In fact, however, the reason the Rawl-
ings court "did not question"-to use Chief Justice Burger's
words-the admissibility of the evidence discovered pursuant to
the warrant later issued was because, as the Court should have
done in Segura, that court resolved the issue on alternative Wong
Sun grounds. What the Rawlings Court did assert, in dictum, was
that "the legality of temporarily detaining a person at the scene of
suspected drug activity to secure a search warrant may be an open
question ....
The Court read Mincey9 6 as approving of the situation in which
"to preserve evidence, a police guard had been stationed at the en-
trance to an apartment . *.".., The only issue before the Court
there, however, was the search of the house, not its seizure. The
propriety of the seizure of items in the house was an issue explictly
left open. 19 8
The justices' use of Place'99 is similarly odd. With regard to the
nearly twenty-hour delay, the Court distinguished Place on the
grounds that it "was not suggested" by that Court that such a de-
lay was unreasonable. 00 It is not surprising that the Court did not
make such a suggestion, however, because the Place court had al-
ready declared the seizure of the suitcase invalid on far more lim-
ited grounds, 0' thereby avoiding the need to reach the issue not
195. 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980).
196. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
197. 104 S. Ct. at 3388.
198. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395 n.9.
199. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
200. 104 S. Ct. at 3390 n.8.
201. One reason why the seizure of personalty was unreasonable was because of its dura-
tion. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2645. The Court was concerned in Place with the fact that, on the
one hand, use of canines to sniff out drugs was a relatively unintrusive way to conduct an
investigation, id. at 2644, but that the seizure of Place's luggage was not done in as non-
intrusive a fashion as it could have been, id. at 2645-46. The Court has indicated before that
"investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available
.... " Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion). Both Place and
Royer were cases which involved investigations based on "reasonable suspicion," not "prob-
able cause." Burger points this out. Segura, 104 S. Ct. at 3390 n.8 (1984). It is at least
debatable, however, whether Burger's opinion in Segura is consistent with the underlying
interests which Place and Royer affirm. The presence of "probable cause" justifies greater
intrusion by police. The longer detention of property, which flows from probable cause, how-
ever, in turn implicates greater interests of the citizen. The fourth amendment, after all,




3. The Nature of the "Securing" Holding
Prior to hearing the case, it was not only apparent that the issue
of securing did not reach the Court in a proper litigation context,
but that any holding was likely to be dictum. And yet, the result of
the Court's handling of the issue was even worse than it should
have been, or needed to be. The nature of the holding is impaired
in at least four ways.
First, Part I purports to state new law regarding the securing of
premises. Part IV, however, presents the only explanation or de-
fense of the rule, and it is signed by only two justices. Plurality
rationales are, unfortunately, not unique.20 3 What is apparently
unique20 4 is that three justices-who apparently like and want this
Burger considers it entirely irrelevant that the police did not follow the "arguably wiser
course" of securing the premises from the outside. It may be true that the "seizure" is
equally intrusive whether the impoundment is internal or external, but surely the net fourth
amendment interests of Colon and Segura were impaired by the internal securing. Id. at
3389. To separate the "search" interest from the "seizure" one must, at some point, sever
the Court's mode of analysis from the commonsense approach it frequently urges others to
apply. See, e.g., 104 S. Ct. at 3392; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). This criticism, of
course, goes to the merits of the decision. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; see
also infra note 202.
202. Chief Justice Burger's citation to a "distinguished constitutional scholar" see supra
note 149 and accompanying text, also was questionable. Burger accurately points out that
the scholar, Dean Griswold, "raised the question whether a seizure of premises might not be
appropriate . . . " 104 S. Ct. at 3388 n.7. Chief Justice Burger implies, however, from the
context in which the quotation is used, that Griswold not only raised the question, but
answered it, and that he did so by approving internal securing of homes. As the dissent
points out, 104 S. Ct. at 3396 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting), however, no such answer from
the article was forthcoming, although it cannot be denied that one reasonable inference
from the article is that Griswold favored some form of securing of premises.
It is also relevant to point out, however, that the author believed that there "is a clear
difference between the search of a home.., and the search of an automobile." Griswold,
supra note 150, at 316. The former is clearly more intrusive. Although Dean Griswold was
speaking about searches, not seizures, he also said that there is a need "to avoid a kind of
intellectual game of chess," and that the law should not be "pushed to a dryly logical ex-
treme." Id. at 319. The separation by Burger of the "search" from the "seizure," however,
strikes me as just such a chess game. See supra note 201.
The Court's use of precedent on the matter of taint also was objectionable. See infra
notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
203. Nonetheless, they were not common until recently. See supra note 13 and accompa-
nying text.
204. The closest to such a case may be United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
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new rule of law-failed to write a separate concurring opinion to
defend the controversial rule, or to explain what they accept, if
anything, of the Burger-O'Connor opinion.
The dissent is unstinting in its condemnation of Part IV.205 In
light of its attack, why would three justices sign a portion of the
opinion creating such a controversial rule and yet not provide the
reader with their collective or individual reasoning? At the very
least, a justice fails to meet his responsibility when he neglects to
defend his conclusions with principled analysis.10
The most generous view of this issue is that the timing of the
decision-and the workload-compelled this absence. Perhaps,
with a reduced workload, the justices would not have allowed the
opinion to be announced until the three silent justices spoke.
Whatever the reason, the finished product does a disservice to the
legal community. Putting aside the Wong Sun issue, Part IV is, in
fact, a concurring opinion by two justices, and can be deleted with-
out affecting the opinion. After all, the "rule" in Part I lacks a
majority explanation. The Court could as well have stated the
facts, its "holding," announced its judgment without rationale, and
closed. The Court has created a new rule, and essentially has pro-
vided no support for the structure.
A published concurrence by the three silent justices would have
improved the quality of the adjudication in a number of ways.
First, the "Silent Three" might have been in only limited disagree-
There, four justices, including Justice Stewart but not Justice White, signed Part I of the
opinion. This portion generally summarized prior case law regarding how to measure the
reliability of informants in applications for search warrants, and it summarized the lower
court's reasoning in the principal case. Then, in the last three sentences of the section, the
Court stated its conclusion in the principal case, and stated one of its rationales, which it
indicated it would "develop" in Part III. Yet, when it did develop its reasoning in Part III,
Part III was signed by four justices, including Justice White, but not including Justice Stew-
art. Thus, by one reading, the rationale developed in Part III carried four votes. If Stewart's
signature to Part I was intended to include the brief, perfunctory allusion to the rationale
later to be "developed," however, then the rationale in Part III carried five votes. But, if
that was true, why did Stewart not sign Part III?
The confusion in Harris seems to be a function of sloppiness in the writing of the opinion
(which, it may be relevant to point out, came at the end of the 1970 court term) and was
not, as in Segura, the result of willful silence.
205. See supra notes 169-71 & 185; see infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
206. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
21 (1959) ("nine men of ten find it easier to reach agreement on result than upon reasons,"
but it is "essential that . . . the variations of position be disclosed").
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ment. As a result, a majority view on much of Part IV might have
been secured. The justices might have disagreed, for example, with
the fact that the Burger-O'Connor opinion gratuitously reaffirmed
the "search" holding in Vale v. Louisiana,0 7 yet have agreed en-
tirely on the matter of the seizure. Second, the three justices might
have provided different and better case law or scholarship to sup-
port this rule, rendering the rule more persuasive. Third, a opinion
explaining their alternative reasoning would have provided police,
lawyers and courts with more understanding of the general views
of the Court on the issues of securing, seizures, and home entries.
Finally, if nothing else, a concurring opinion would make less per-
suasive a claim that the entire opinion was riddled by disinterest,
fatigue, or overload.
A second problem is that the Court not only provides us with an
unsupported rule, but that rule is dictum. This result was predict-
able 208 if not inevitable. If the Court was going to assume that the
entry was unlawful, and assume that a seizure occurred, it should
also have assumed that the seizure was unreasonable. It would not
have affected the result. The Court indicated twice that the reason
for granting a hearing was to decide if a seizure, upon a lawful war-
rant, untaints evidence originally seized as a result of an illegal en-
try.20 9 This was the Wong Sun question.210 According to the Part V
reasoning, no taint existed because no causal connection existed
between the illegal entry and the later warranted seizure, and be-
cause the Court, as a matter of law, will apparently not counte-
nance claims of causation based on hypothetical destruction of evi-
dence by suspects. Such reasoning renders irrelevant not only the
illegality of the entry (as it concedes),211 but also the lawfulness, or
unlawfulness, of the occupation. The Court's new law, then, repre-
sents much ado about nothing. It is wasteful adjudication, and the
207. 104 S. Ct. at 3389. Regarding the relationship of Vale to Segura, see supra note 88.
208. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
210. Inexplicably, and incorrectly, the Court indicated in Part I that resolution of this
issue "required" it to consider whether the securing constituted an impermissible seizure of
all the contents. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. Yet, the Court later conceded
that resolution of that issue was not required. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying
text.
211. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Court will have to do it all over again in the future.212
The third problem with the case is that the Court's dic-
tum-even as an advisory opinion-fails to deal adequately with
the plain view evidence. Again, the Court made matters worse for
itself. The high court points out that the admissibility of these
items was not before it, 213 yet simultaneously Chief Justice Burger
and Justice O'Connor use the inadmissibility of the evidence as ap-
parent 214 partial support for their claim that their "securing" rule
will not undermine the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. 216
The propriety of the plain view suppression order was not before
the Court, which made discussion of it inappropriate. Once the
Court began its discussion, however, it should have provided a
principled justification for the distinction. None was forthcoming.
As a matter of logic-and common sense-none seems apparent.
Once the Court viewed the issue to be one of "seizure," not
"search," and once it assumed that the securing of the home was a
seizure of all of the contents of the apartment, the Court should
have treated alike all such contents, including the plain view
items.21e
The final problem with Segura is that one of the elements of the
"rule" regarding securing is good faith by the officers. Bad faith
would, presumably, render securing unreasonable. Yet the Court
212. The Arizona Supreme Court recently rejected the Segura dictum regarding securing
of premises. State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1984). The court was aware that the Segura
holding was dictum, but it felt that "we must conclude that a majority of the Court may
soon reach the view" that such securing is reasonable. To take no chances that the dictum
will become binding on the state, the state court applied its own constitution to protect
citizens from police conduct such as that involved in Bolt (and Segura).
213. See supra notes 133-34 & 138-40 and accompanying text.
214. "Apparent" is used because the justices ambiguously say that police will realize that
an unlawful entry "may" result in suppression of plain view evidence. They did not say
"will" or "should." 104 S. Ct. at 3390.
215. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
216. It does not appear plausible to distinguish between the classes of evidence on the
ground that the plain view items involved a search, while the rest of the items implicated a
seizure. The unlawfulness of the "search" of the plain view items, and the consequent viola-
tion of privacy, might make a civil suit appropriate. Here, however, the issue was the exclu-
sion of evidence in a criminal trial because of an allegedly unlawful seizure. As to that issue
all of the evidence was arguably seized in the "reasonable" occupation, and seized, again, in
the valid warranted search, so a distinction based on the seizure seems difficult to concoct.
If there is one, and if the justices were going to defend the different treatment, the Court
should have provided some rationale.
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offers no precedent for this substantive distinction. Indeed, there is
none. Although "good faith" is now an element factor of the exclu-
sionary rule, at least where a warrant is issued,217 not only was
there no relevant warrant here, but the Court uses the concept of
good faith in Segura to create a substantive, not exclusionary rule,
doctrine. The Court seemingly requires good faith without serious
discussion. Such sloppiness can be expected of tired justices, anx-
ious to end the opinion-and the Court term.
C. The Taint Holding (Part V)
Segura is impaired by its treatment of the issue of the securing.
Nonetheless, the Court did render a five-vote ruling with rationale,
that is not dictum, regarding the question of taint. Merits aside,
however, one can make three objections to the adjudicative
process.
First, the only binding new rule that comes out of this case is
that the Court is unwilling to "further 'protect' criminal activity,
as the dissent would have us do,' 2 18 by using the possibility of the
destruction of evidence as a basis to prove causation (and ulti-
mately, taint). 19 The dissent argues,220 with some force, that de-
struction of evidence was precisely the basis for the finding of taint
in other cases. 221 How then does the Court justify this new bright
line rejection of taint? The answer is found in only three sentences,
and a careful look at the three sentences raises doubt about the
quality of the deliberative process.
The first sentence is a quote from the 1938 Nardone decision.
All of the justices originally credited the wrong justice for the
statement.222 Perhaps this is a small point, especially since the
Court later corrected it. Nevertheless, this sloppiness is a sign of a
body worked beyond its limits. If the Court makes this basic error,
217. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.
Ct. 3424 (1984).
218. 104 S. Ct. at 3392.
219. The precise scope of this rule is unclear because it is unclear whether such evidence
is irrelevant where the claim is that a nondefendant might destroy the evidence.
220. 104 S. Ct. at 3400-03.
221. Id. at 3401 & n.28 (citing, for example, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091 (1984);
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983)).
222. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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can we be confident about the rest?2 '
Indeed, what is the rest? The only additional support for the
new law was the wholly conclusory statement that "the essence of
the dissent is that there is some 'constitutional right' to destroy
evidence. The concept defies both logic and common sense." '224 The
dissenters never implied any such "right," however. The only
"right" the dissenters claim is the right of all citizens to be assured
that once a tree is poisoned by the government, its fruits are not
ingested without assurances that they, too, are not unwholesome. A
new rule of law deserves more than a quote out of context from the
dictum of a 1939 decision, originally credited to the wrong judge,
followed by a conclusory statement that is hardly self-evident.
More time could only have improved the opinion.
Second, the justices cite no precedent for the new rule, while the
lower court opinions they do cite are of questionable value. As pre-
viously noted,225 the justices assert that their holding is consistent
with the "vast majority" of circuit court opinions, which have held
that evidence obtained pursuant to a valid warrant "need not be
excluded" because of a prior illegal entry. The Court cited five
cases, 22 one of which it concbded was dictum. These cases, how-
ever, only hold that evidence "need not" be excluded; they do not
stand for the Court's stronger proposition in Segura that such evi-
dence always dissipates the taint.22 7 Moreover, three of the five
cases cited are significantly distinguishable.228
223. The language quoted from Nardone was dictum, and was excised from the following
language immediately preceding it, by Justice Frankfurter: "[t]o forbid the direct use of
methods.... but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very meth-
ods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destruction of personal liberty'." Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
224. 104 S. Ct. at 3392.
225. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
226. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
227. Indeed, if the "vast majority" of cases had said this, there would have been even less
need to hear the case.
228. United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1981), and United States v. Fitzhar-
ris, 633 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1980), both involved external securing. United States v. Bosby,
675 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1982), involved the securing of a suitcase found in an automobile,
not a home.
Another case cited, United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir. 1983) simply cited
United States v. Beck, 662 F.2d 527 (1981) as support for the rule; Beck, however, reached
the result perfunctorily, merely by citing other cases. United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324
(2nd. Cir. 1980), also cited, was similarly devoid of rationale.
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Third, Segura's facts regarding the items in plain view under-
mine the new rule. The Court implies that these items were prop-
erly excluded, but it fails to tell us why, on the issue of taint, these
seized items are different from the others. The justices owe the
reader this much. No reason -of logic or policy explains this
distinction.229
D. Vituperation
Justice Stevens frequently has expressed his displeasure with the
recent direction of the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence;20
this case probably represents his most strident condemnation. One
cannot know whether the language he used here was, at least par-
tially, the result of fatigue. Nonetheless, the dissent's language is
noteworthy. Justice Stevens accuses the Chief Justice of "simply
ignor[ing] ' ' 231 important points, making an "untenable" assump-
tion,23 2 and writing an "adversary's brief; 23 3 he condemns the
Court's remarkable "misuse '23 4 of precedent, for reaching "aston-
ishing, '23 5 "absurd, '236 "strange '23 7 holdings, ones "as reasonable
as was the agents' conduct, '238 which is described elsewhere as
229. I have already developed why such a distinction is unpersuasive regarding the matter
of securing. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text. Here, the policy arguments for
a distinction on the matter of taint are harder to fathom.
In light of the fact the occupation was reasonable, why should the inadvertent visual
sighting of items while in the home result in suppression, just because the entry was unlaw-
ful? What reason of deterrence justifies its suppression, once one says, as does the Court,
that internal securing is valid?
More relevantly, how do we know the two officers "discovered" nothing else in the twenty
hours they camped out in the home? Simply, we do not. The Court is at the mercy of the
memory and honesty of the two officers. A rule which puts a premium on perjury is not a
good rule. Accidental, good-faith sighting of evidence in a home, while a warrant is secured,
should not be suppressed-at least, if good faith delays by officers in securing the warrant
are reasonable, and if the seizure of the premises is itself reasonable.
230. See supra notes 79 & 81 and accompanying text.
231. 104 S. Ct. at 3395.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 3396 n.12.
234. Id. n.14.
235. Id. at 3397.
236. Id. at 3404.
237. Id. at 3397.
238. Id. at 3398.
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"blatantly unconstitutional. 23 9
VII. CONCLUSION
Segura is a disaster as a written opinion. The Court should
never have granted hearing, or, having done so, should have dis-
missed certiorari as improvidently granted. It wrote a sloppy and
poorly organized opinion. It wasted its own time, going out of its
way to render a holding on an issue not before it. The result was
dictum, in which three of the five supporters of the rule fail even
to explain their vote. The opinion of the other two justices for the
rule is riddled with difficulties. Even the portion of the opinion not
dictum is weakened by sloppiness, lack of substantial explanatory
force, and poor use of case law.
A message emerges from this morass. The Court no longer can
afford to continue to follow its activist approach. One can in prin-
ciple favor activism, and even defend such involvement in order to
"undo the damage 2 40 of the Warren Court's fourth amendment
jurisprudence; but those principles must give way to a possibly un-
pleasant reality. The reality is, simply, that the Court cannot con-
tinue to decide so many cases, and at the same time fulfill its re-
ponsibility to do proper research, deliberate fully, and write
coherent, well-drafted opinions. Perhaps court opinions will never
be items of fine art. They should, however, be better products of
adjudication than was Segura v. United States. Absent structural
changes, the Court must limit itself or risk the loss of the respect
of even those in the legal community who agree with the majority's
philosophical predilection.
239. Id. at 3403.
240. I do not have such a view of the work of the Warren Court, but obviously many do.
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